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Is the Quechan Tribe Barred
From Seeking a Determination of Reservation
Boundaries and Water Rights?
by Judith V Royster
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 393-399. © 2000 American Bar Association.
FACTS
Judith V. Royster is a professor The facts and procedural history of
of law and the co-director this case include both the legal his-
of the Native American Law tory of the Fort Yuma Reservation of
Program at the University the Quechan Tribe and the history
of Tulsa. She can be reached of the litigation between the states
at judith-royster@utulsa.edu of Arizona and California over rights
or (918) 631-3191. to water in the Colorado River.
Like the facts of most Indian




" " ,t <, k - '.
Gsage.-
Editor's Note: The Report and
Recommendation of the Special
Master was not available by
PREVIEWs deadline. This article is
based on the Exceptions to the
report filed by the State parties, the
United States, and the Quechan
Indian Tribe and on the brief of the
United States filed in reply to the
state parties' Exception.
ISSUES
Do the Supreme Court's prior deci-
sions in the Arizona v. California
litigation over rights to water in the
Colorado River preclude the
Quechan Tribe from seeking
additional water rights for its
"boundary lands"?
Does a judgment of the Claims
Court, approving a stipulated settle-
ment between the Quechan Tribe
and the United States, bar the Tribe
and the United States from seeking
a determination of the boundaries of
the Tribe's reservation and the
attendant reserved water rights?
The Fort Yuma Reservation. The
Quechan Tribe (Yuma Indians),
indigenous to the southwest, today
occupies the Fort Yuma
Reservation. The Reservation, strad-
dling the Colorado River where it
forms the Arizona-California border,
was established by executive order
in 1884. Executive Order, President
Chester A. Arthur (Jan. 9, 1884);
see Charles J. Kappler, I Indian
Affairs Laws and Treaties 832
(1904). In 1893, the Tribe and the
federal government negotiated an
(Continued on Page 394)
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agreement calling for the Tribe to
cede "all their right, title, claim, and
interest in and to" approximately
25,000 acres in California "upon the
conditions hereinafter expressed."
1893 Agreement with the Yuma
Indians in California, Art. I. The
agreement was ratified by Congress
the following year. Act of Aug. 15,
1894, 28 Stat. 286, 332.
The conditions upon which the
Tribe agreed to cede its lands
included the construction of an irri-
gation canal within three years, the
allotment of irrigated lands to tribal
members, the sale of most non-allot-
ted lands to raise funds to help pay
for the canal, and the opening of the
non-irrigable lands to settlement.
1893 Agreement, Arts. III-VII.
However, the irrigation canal was
not constructed, some of the non-
allotted irrigable lands were not sold
(and thus revenues for the canal
were not realized), and the lands
not irrigated were not opened to
non-Indian settlement. See Opinion
of the Solicitor, No. M-36908 (Dec.
20, 1978), 86 Int. Dec. 1 (1979).
In the early years of the 20th centu-
ry, a federal irrigation system was
constructed on portions of the Fort
Yuma Reservation pursuant to a
special authorization under the
Reclamation Act of 1904. See 32
Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 371 et seq.). The project
provided irrigation by 1910 for
some 6,500 acres sold to non-
Indians, and by 1917 for approxi-
mately 2,000 acres of Indian lands.
In the mid-1930s, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs requested permission
from the Tribe for a right-of-way
across the Reservation for construc-
tion of the All-American Canal.
In 1936, the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior issued an
opinion that under the 1893
Agreement, title to the non-irrigable
lands, now needed for the All-
American Canal, had vested imme-
diately in the United States. The
opinion concluded that the 1893
Agreement was an unconditional
cession of the Quechan lands.
Accordingly, the Solicitor opined, no
tribal consent was necessary for
canal construction. Yuma
Reservation-Title to Lands, I
Opinions of the Solicitor 596 (No.
M-28198 Jan. 8, 1936).
In 1951, the Tribe filed a claim,
known as Docket 320, with the
Indian Claims Commission (ICC).
The Tribe claimed that the federal
government had taken the lands
pursuant to the 1893 Agreement
without just compensation and that
the United States had violated its
duty of "fair and honorable deal-
ings" in negotiating and implement-
ing the 1893 Agreement. See Indian
Claims Commission Act, § 2, 60
Stat. 1050. In 1958, the Tribe
amended its claim to assert the
alternative theory that the 1893
Agreement was never implemented,
that the Tribe therefore retained
beneficial title to the 25,000 acres,
and that the Tribe was owed tres-
pass damages for unlawful use of the
lands. (The ICC, like the United
States Claims Court, where cases
pending before the ICC were trans-
ferred when the ICC ceased opera-
tions in 1978, had the authority to
award only damages as a remedy.)
In 1978, the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior issued a
new opinion reversing the 1936
opinion. No. M-36908 (Dec. 20,
1978), 86 Int. Dec. 3 (1979). The
1978 opinion concluded that the
Tribe's cession of lands was depen-
dent upon the conditions stated in
the 1893 Agreement. Because those
conditions had never been met, the
land cession had not taken place.
The Secretary of the Interior issued
an order that same day that the
boundaries of the Fort Yuma
Reservation were thus those estab-
lished by the 1884 Executive Order,
as amended by Executive Order of
Dec. 19, 1900. See Secretarial
Determination and Directives of
December 20, 1978, published at 46
Fed. Reg. 11,372 (1981).
In 1983, the Quechan Tribe and the
United States entered into a stipu-
lated settlement of the Tribe's
Docket 320 claim filed with the
Indian Claims Commission (now
before the Claims Court). Because
the Secretarial Order of 1978
amounted to an admission by the
United States that the Tribe owned
the disputed land, the parties jointly
stipulated that the boundaries
established in 1884, as modified by
executive order in 1900, remained
the present reservation boundaries.
Joint Memorandum Re: Stipulation,
4 (May 26, 1983), reprinted in
Exception of the United States and
Brief for the United States in
Support of Exception, No. 8, Orig.
(Dec. 20, 1999) at App. E. Under
the settlement, the Tribe received
$15 million "for damages for the
taking of parts of the Reservation
after 1893 and the loss of use of
other parts of the Reservation from
1893 to 1978." Stipulation for
Settlement and Entry of Final
Judgment (Aug. 9, 1983), App. A,
quoted in Exception of the Quechan
Indian Tribe to the Report and
Recommendation of the Special
Master and Supporting
Memorandum, No. 8, Orig. (Dec. 20,
1999) at 14.
In addition, the parties stipulated
that "[t]he final judgment entered
pursuant to this stipulation shall be
construed to be a compromise and
settlement and shall not be con-
strued as an admission by either
party for the purpose of precedent
or argument in any other case."
Joint Motion for Approval of
Settlement and Entry of Final
Judgment, 2 (July 27, 1983),
reprinted in Exception of the United
Issue No. 7
States at App. G. The judgment in
Docket 320, entered by the Claims
Court in 1983, recited this stipula-
tion. Final Judgment (Cl. Ct. Aug.
11, 1983), reprinted in Exception of
the United States at App. H.
The Arizona v. California
Litigation. In the meantime,
Arizona had sued California over
rights to the water in the Colorado
River. The case was filed in 1952 as
an original action in the United
States Supreme Court. Arizona v.
California (Arizona I), 373 U.S.
546, 550-51 (1963), decree entered,
376 U.S. 340 (1964). The
Constitution provides that certain
types of lawsuits, including lawsuits
to which a state is a party, are with-
in the original jurisdiction of the
Court, that is, those actions can be
filed directly in the Supreme Court
rather than in federal district court.
U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. Although
the Court's original jurisdiction is
seldom invoked today, it is exclusive
in cases of disputes between states,
25 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), which gen-
erally concern boundaries or rights
to interstate waters.
When an original jurisdiction case is
filed, the Court refers the case to a
"special master," who takes evi-
dence, finds facts, states conclu-
sions of law, and recommends a
decree. See Arizona I, 373 U.S. at
551. The special master files a
report and recommendations with
the Court, and the parties to the
action may file "exceptions" to the
master's report along with support-
ing briefs. If exceptions are filed, the
Court sets the case for oral argu-
ment the same as it does for cases
it takes under its appellate
jurisdiction.
When Arizona sued California in the
Supreme Court, the United States
intervened, in part in its capacity as
trustee for Indian lands and proper-
ty rights. The United States asserted
the water rights of five Indian reser-
vations in Arizona, California, and
Nevada, including the Fort Yuma
Reservation of the Quechan Tribe.
Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 595. The trib-
al water rights were asserted on the
basis of Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908), which held
that when an Indian reservation is
created, sufficient water is impliedly
reserved to fulfill the purposes for
which the reservation was set aside.
In Arizona I, the Court determined
that this doctrine of tribal reserved
water rights, or "Winters rights,"
applied not only to reservations cre-
ated by treaty or statute, but also to
those such as Fort Yuma created by
executive order. The Court held that
water rights were reserved to tribes
regardless of whether the reserva-
tion was created before or after
statehood, and that the usual mea-
sure of a tribe's right to water to ful-
fill the agricultural purpose of a
reservation was enough water to
irrigate all the practicably irrigable
acreage (PIA) of the reservation.
373 U.S. at 596-601.
In addition, the Court in Arizona I
found it "unnecessary" to determine
the disputed boundaries of two of
the Indian reservations at issue:
Colorado River and Fort Mojave. Id.
at 601. As a result, when the decree
was entered in 1964, see 376 U.S.
340 (1964), it provided for future
adjustments of water rights for
those two reservations "in the event
that the boundaries of the respec-
tive reservations are finally deter-
mined." 376 U.S. at 345.
In 1978, recall, the Interior Solicitor
issued an opinion reaffirming the
1884 boundaries of the Fort Yuma
Reservation. The following day, the
United States moved to modify the
1964 Decree for that reservation,
arguing for an equitable modifica-
tion of water rights for the Quechan
lands. The Supreme Court entered a
Supplemental Decree in 1979 that
described the water rights for the
five reservations at issue in the
Arizona litigation but also provided
that the quantities of water for all
the reservations, including Fort
Yuma, "shall continue to be subject
to appropriate adjustment by agree-
ment or decree of this Court in the
event that the boundaries of the
respective reservations are finally
determined." Arizona v. California,
439 U.S. 419, 421 (1979).
In 1983, the Court reviewed find-
ings of the special master regarding
two types of Quechan lands:
"boundary lands" (lands deter-
mined to be within the Fort Yuma
Reservation because of a final
boundary determination) and
"omitted lands" (lands that should
have been declared practicably irri-
gable acreage in the 1964 Decree
but weren't). Arizona v. California,
460 U.S. 605 (1983). The Court
held that the 1964 Decree barred a
redetermination of water rights for
the omitted lands, under general
principles of res judicata (claim
preclusion). Id. at 626. As to the
boundary lands, the Court found
that the 1978 Secretarial Order was
not a final determination of the
reservation boundaries because the
State parties had not had the oppor-
tunity to obtain judicial review of
the administrative decision. Id. at
637-38. In its 1984 Supplemental
Decree, the Court again provided
that the quantities of water
reserved for the five Indian reserva-
tions "shall be subject to appropri-
ate adjustments by agreement or
decree of this Court in the event
that the boundaries of the respec-
tive reservations are finally deter-
mined." 466 U.S. 144, 145 (1984).
In a judicial challenge to the
Secretarial Order brought by
California and its agencies, the dis-
trict court invalidated the Order.
Metropolitan Water District of
(Conainued on Page 396)
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Southern California v. United
States, 628 F.Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal.
1986). The court of appeals
reversed on the ground that the
Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a,
grants the United States sovereign
immunity from suit challenging its
title to Indian lands held in trust.
Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California v. United
States, 830 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals by an
equally divided Court. California v.
United States, 490 U.S. 920 (1989).
Following that decision, the State
parties moved to reopen the 1964
Decree to secure final determina-
tions of the boundaries of three of
the Indian reservations, including
Fort Yuma. The Court ordered the
decree reopened, Arizona v.
California, 493 U.S. 886 (1989),
and referred the matter to a special
master. The special master issued
his report and recommendation on
July 28, 1999. He concluded, con-
trary to the State parties' con-
tention, that the Court's previous
decisions in the Arizona litigation
did not prevent the Quechan Tribe
from seeking additional water rights
for its boundary lands. The State
parties filed an exception to this
conclusion. The special master also
concluded, however, that the 1983
judgment of the Court of Claims,
approving the settlement of the
Tribe's claims against the United
States, bars adjudication of the
Fort Yuma Reservation boundaries
and thus of the water rights
attached to the boundary lands.
Both the Quechan Tribe and the
United States filed exceptions to
this conclusion.
CASE ANALYSIS
The State Parties' Exception. The
State parties in this proceeding
(Arizona, California, and certain
state agencies) filed an exception to
the special master's conclusion that
the Quechan Tribe was not preclud-
ed from seeking additional water
rights by prior decisions in the
Arizona litigation.
First, the State parties note that in
Arizona II, the Court refused to
reconsider water rights for the
"omitted lands" of the Fort Yuma
Reservation, 460 U.S. 605, 617-26
(1983), because the claim could
have been raised earlier based on
facts known at that time. The same
principle, the State parties argue,
applies to the boundary lands: the
United States could have raised the
issue of water rights for the bound-
ary lands at an earlier proceeding.
The United States counters that
there are "fundamental distinctions"
between the omitted lands issue and
the boundary lands question. First,
the United States asserts that unlike
the omitted lands issue, the bound-
ary lands question turns on the
validity of the 1978 Secretarial
Order rather than on a redetermina-
tion of factual matters resolved in
Arizona I. Next, the United States
argues that the boundary lands
claim could not have been decided
in Arizona I because the Court
ruled in that case that the special
master had erred in reaching the
boundary question for two other
tribes. And finally, the United States
asserts that the 1979 and 1984
Supplemental Decrees expressly
provided for modification of water
rights based on the final determina-
tion of the reservation boundaries
but made no equivalent provision
for modification of water rights for
omitted lands. Thus, the United
States argues, the Court left the
boundary lands issue open for later
resolution.
Second, the State parties contend
that they did not waive their right
to raise a defense of preclusion in
the earlier proceedings. They argue
that the language of the 1979
Supplemental Decree, providing that
the quantities of water described
"shall continue to be subject to
appropriate adjustment ... in the
event that the boundaries of the
respective reservations are finally
determined," 439 U.S. 419, 421,
does not require any final boundary
determination and thus cannot be
read as a waiver of State defenses.
Third, the State parties argue that
their preclusion defense is not
untimely. Although the State parties
concede that they did not raise the
defense in opposition to the 1978
motion by the Tribe and the United
States to reopen the 1964 Decree,
they claim that the issue could be
raised by the Court sua sponte (on
its own). The State parties also
assert that the Tribe and the United
States have had a full opportunity to
litigate the question before the spe-
cial master and that the State par-
ties' failure to raise the preclusion
issue earlier has not prejudiced
the Tribe.
The United States disagrees on both
the waiver and timeliness issues,
insisting that preclusion is an affir-
mative defense, which the State par-
ties were obligated to raise in a
timely manner. The United States
contrasts the State parties' assertion
of a preclusion defense to the
Tribe's omitted lands claims with
the State parties' lack of a preclu-
sion defense at that time to the
boundary lands issue. Moreover, the
United States notes that the State
parties stipulated to the language in
the 1979 Supplemental Decree that
the water rights of all five reserva-
tions would be subject to modifica-
tion "in the event that the bound-
aries of the respective reservations
are finally determined," a stipula-
tion that the United States asserts is
consistent with the State parties'
waiver of a preclusion defense.
Issue No. 7396
In addition, the United States relies
on the Court's statement in Arizona
II that "if at all possible, the bound-
ary disputes would be settled in
other forums [than the Court]." See
460 U.S. at 638. The government
argues that the Court would not
have so directed the parties if the
Court believed that the boundary
issue was precluded from litigation.
Similarly, the United States insists
that the Court would not have reit-
erated in its 1984 Supplemental
Decree that tribal water rights "shall
be subject to appropriate adjust-
ments by agreement or decree of
this Court in the event that the
boundaries of the respective reser-
vations are finally determined," 466
U.S. 144, 145 (1984), if the
Quechan Tribe was in fact preclud-
ed from litigating the boundary
lands question.
Finally, the State parties note that
the special master rejected the State
parties' preclusion claim on the
ground that water rights for the
Quechan boundary lands were
based on "new facts" not available
or ascertainable at an earlier time.
The State parties argue that no new
facts were at issue, only a change in
legal theory based on the Interior
Solicitor's 1978 opinion reversing
the 1936 opinion. The State parties
maintain that the Tribe and the
United States should be precluded
from pursuing a different legal theo-
ry that is based on the same facts
already adjudicated.
The United States maintains that
although the Court can modify its
decrees in response to changed cir-
cumstances, the federal government
"does not rely on that rationale in
this case." Instead, the government
relies on its other reasons for claim-
ing the boundary lands issue is not
precluded and argues that "there is
no occasion to explore the more dif-
ficult and fact-specific question of
what types of 'changed conditions'
would justify the modification of
this Court's water rights decrees."
Reply Brief for the United States,
at 21.
The Tribe's and United States'
Exceptions. The Quechan Tribe and
the United States both filed excep-
tions to the conclusion of the spe-
cial master that the 1983 judgment
of the Court of Claims, approving
the settlement of the Tribe's claims
against the United States, bars adju-
dication of the Fort Yuma
Reservation boundaries. Both the
tribal and federal parties raise two
interrelated arguments in exception
to the master's determination.
First, the Tribe and the government
argue that nothing in the claims
judgment indicates that the judg-
ment precluded subsequent litiga-
tion of the Tribe's reservation
boundaries. The two parties both
fundamentally claim that the special
master misunderstood the purpose
and import of the judgment.
Both the Tribe and the United
States focus on the language of their
joint stipulation that was incorpo-
rated in the final judgment of the
Claims Court, which said the judg-
ment "shall not be construed as an
admission by either party for the
purpose of precedent or argument
in any other case." The parties
argue that this language indicates
their clear joint intent that the set-
tlement not preclude either of them
from litigating related issues against
other parties in other forums.
In addition, both parties dispute the
special master's apparent assump-
tion that the claims judgment
accorded the Tribe $15 million for
the cession of its boundary lands in
1893. The parties state that the fed-
eral government's payment to the
Tribe was primarily to compensate
the Tribe for the temporary depriva-
tion, from 1936 to 1978, of the
boundary lands at issue. The pay-
ment was not and could not have
been payment for cession of the
boundary lands, the parties assert,
because both the Tribe and the
United States stipulated that the
Tribe retained beneficial ownership
of those lands.
Second, the Tribe and the govern-
ment argue that principles of collat-
eral estoppel (issue preclusion) do
not bar the special master from
determining the boundaries of the
Fort Yuma Reservation. Both parties
rely primarily on the "actually liti-
gated" standard, which provides
that issue preclusion applies only if
the issue sought to be precluded
was "actually litigated and neces-
sary to the outcome of the first
action." Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5
(1979); see also Regions Hospital v.
Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 463-64
(1998); Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351, 353 (1877). The parties
point out that neither the issue of
the Quechan boundary lands nor
the issue of the Tribe's water rights
for those lands had been litigated
before the claims tribunal. Instead,
the claims judgment was entered
"based on a compromise and settle-
ment" of the parties. Both parties
cite authorities for the proposition
that a consent judgment, because it
is not actually litigated, cannot
result in issue preclusion. See
Restatement (Second) Judgments §
27 comment e (1982); 18 Moore's
Federal Practice (3d ed.) §
132.01[21 [I1 [1 (1997). The parties
assert that this principle applies
particularly where, as here, the par-
ties to the judgment expressly stipu-
lated that the judgment "shall not
be construed as an admission by
either party for the purposes of
precedent or argument in any
other case."
(Continued on Page 398)
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The United States also argues that
res judicata (claim preclusion) does
not bar relitigation of the bound-
aries of the Tribe's reservation. The
claims judgment clearly bars reliti-
gation of the Tribe's damages claims
before the ICC against the United
States, but it does not prevent
either the Tribe or the United States
from asserting a different claim-
the right to water for the boundary
lands-in a different forum against a
different party, here the State par-
ties to the Arizona litigation.
Finally, the Tribe argues that if the
conclusion of the special master is
sustained by the Court, the Tribe is
entirely foreclosed from a judicial
determination of the boundaries of
the Fort Yuma Reservation.
Based on their exceptions, the
United States and the Quechan
Tribe ask the Court to remand the
case to the special master for a
determination of the boundary
lands. If the case is remanded, the
issues would be whether the 1893
Agreement was a conditional ces-
sion of land and, if so, whether the
United States failed to fulfill those
conditions. If those questions are
resolved in favor of the Tribe, it
would be entitled to water rights for
the boundary lands.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case is significant on a number
of levels. First, it has obvious signifi-
cance for the Quechan Tribe. If the
Court rules against the Tribe's and
the United States' exception, the
Tribe is foreclosed from any judicial
determination of its ownership of
the boundary lands as well as the
attendant water rights. In the
absence of a final judicial determi-
nation, the 1978 Secretarial Order
represents a federal determination
that the Quechan Tribe retains ben-
eficial ownership of the boundary
lands. Those lands are within the
Fort Yuma Reservation and subject
to tribal and federal jurisdiction.
But with only the administrative
decision, the Tribe cannot pursue
the water rights that otherwise
would attach to the trust lands, thus
denying to the Quechan Tribe cer-
tain rights guaranteed to Indian
tribes by federal law. The Tribe's
only recourse would be an appeal to
Congress for a declaration of tribal
ownership of the boundary lands.
The case has equal significance for
the State parties. Water is the most
precious resource in the Western
states. If the Tribe and the United
States may pursue water rights for
the boundary lands, and if they pre-
vail in asserting those rights, the
tribal water rights may displace
some state-law water rights. In the
Western United States, water is allo-
cated on a "first-come, first-served"
basis, with all water rights accorded
a "priority date." The priority date
of tribal Winters rights to water is
the date the reservation was created
or, in the case of the Quechan
Tribe, 1884. Because most Indian
reservations were created in the
mid- to late-19th century, before
many state-law water rights were
perfected, tribal reserved rights to
water generally have earlier priority
dates than most state-law rights. In
times of shortage, therefore, the
tribal water rights must be met
before subsequent non-Indian
rights. Any increase in the Tribe's
reserved water rights thus means
less water available to subsequent
state-law users. Moreover, the Court
ruled in Arizona I that "all uses of
mainstream water within a State are
to be charged against that State's
apportionment." 373 U.S. at 601.
Thus, any increase in the Quechan
Tribe's water rights for lands in
Arizona and California decreases
the states' shares of Colorado River
water by the same amount.
On a procedural level, this case is
an opportunity for the Court to rule
on the preclusive effect of stipulated
judgments. Although the Court's
"actually litigated" standard for
issue preclusion is well established,
the parties do not point to any case
in which the Court has applied that
standard to a consent judgment.
The consensus of treatise writers
and lower federal courts appears to
be that a consent judgment does not
preclude subsequent litigation of
related issues against different par-
ties, particularly where the parties
to the consent judgment did not
clearly intend any such preclusive
effect. See Federal Procedure §
51:260 (1997). This case, however,
will be the first ruling from the
Court on that question.
Finally, the case has significance
with respect to bringing the Arizona
litigation to a close. The only out-
standing issue in that litigation is
the water rights for the Quechan
boundary lands, an issue that the
United States is "hopeful" can be
brought to a negotiated settlement if
the claim is allowed to proceed.
Exception of the United States, at
42. The Arizona v. California law-
suit was filed in 1952. It has been to
the Supreme Court three times
prior to this current proceeding and
has outlasted several special mas-
ters and numerous justices. Bringing
the litigation to a close by its 50th
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